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To guarantee the security of quantum key distribution (QKD), several assumptions on light sources
must be satisfied. For example, each random bit information is precisely encoded on an optical
pulse and the photon-number probability distribution of the pulse is exactly known. Unfortunately,
however, it is hard to check if all the assumptions are really met in practice, and it is preferable that
we have minimal number of device assumptions. In this paper, we adopt the differential-phase-shift
(DPS) QKD protocol and drastically mitigate the requirements on light sources. Specifically, we
only assume the independence among emitted pulses, the independence of the vacuum emission
probability from a chosen bit, and upper bounds on the tail distribution function of the total
photon number in a single block of pulses for single, two and three photons. Remarkably, no other
detailed characterizations, such as the amount of phase modulation, are required. Our security proof
significantly relaxes demands for light sources, which paves a route to guarantee implementation
security with simple verification of the devices.
Introduction
Quantum key distribution (QKD) holds promise for
information-theoretically secure communication between
two distant parties, Alice and Bob [1]. Since QKD is
a physical cryptography in which security is based on a
mathematical model of the devices, several assumptions
on Alice’s light source and Bob’s measurement unit have
to be satisfied to guarantee the security. Any discrepan-
cies between the device model and properties of the ac-
tual devices could be exploited to hack the implemented
QKD systems. In fact, several experiments to crack im-
plementation of QKD systems have been reported [2–5],
which is a crucial threat for security of QKD, and there-
fore it is important to close the gap between theory and
practice.
So far, tremendous efforts have been made to relax
the demands for light sources (see e.g. a review arti-
cle [6]). One possible approach to close the gap is to
use device-independent (DI) QKD (see e.g. [7] and refer-
ences therein). However, to share an almost maximally
entangled state between distant Alice and Bob in or-
der to violate the Bell inequality is not practical with
current technology, which renders DI protocols impracti-
cal at present. On the other hand, as for the device-
dependent QKD, the BB84 protocol [8] is one of the
most investigated protocols, and its security assuming
an ideal single-photon source [9–11] and an ideal phase
randomized coherent-light source [12] were proved. The
security proofs were generalized to accommodate dom-
inant imperfections of the devices. For example, per-
fect phase randomization is relaxed to discrete phase
randomization [13], inter-pulse intensity correlations be-
tween neighboring pulses have been accommodated [14],
and a perfectly symmetric encoding of random bit infor-
mation is relaxed to asymmetric encoding with the loss-
tolerant protocol [15, 16]. Another promising protocol
is the round-robin differential phase shift (RRDPS) pro-
tocol [17]. Its implementation security proof has been
studied [18], which shows that the RRDPS protocol is
robust against source flaws. However, the variable-delay
interferometer used in this protocol is an obstacle to sim-
ple implementation.
In this paper, we adopt the differential-phase-shift
(DPS) protocol [19] and drastically mitigate the de-
mands for light sources, which is useful for simple
characterization of the devices with quantified security.
Our characterizations of light sources are based on the
photon-number statistics of emitted pulses. Specifically,
we suppose that the vacuum emission probability of
each pulse is independent of a chosen bit, and an upper
bound qn (for n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) on the probability that
each block of pulses contains n or more photons. Here,
these probabilities are the ones that would be obtained
if we performed a photon number measurement, and
we do not assume that the state is a classical mixture
of Fock states. Remarkably, detailed characterizations
of the source devices that were needed in previous
security proofs of DPS protocol [20, 21] and the original
DPS protocol [19], such as the precise control of phase
modulations, complete knowledge of the photon-number
probability distribution, block-wise phase randomiza-
tion, and a single-mode assumption on the emitted pulse
are not necessary.
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2Results
Assumptions on the devices. Before describing
the protocol, we summarize the assumptions we make
on the source and the receiver. First, we list up the
assumptions on Alice’s source as follows. In this paper,
for simplicity of the security analysis, we consider the
case where Alice employs three pulses contained in a
single-block.
(A1) Alice chooses a random three-bit sequence ~bA :=
bA1 b
A
2 b
A
3 ∈ {0, 1}3, and bAi is encoded only on the
ith pulse in system Si. Depending on the chosen
~bA, Alice prepares a following three-pulse state in
system S := S1S2S3:
ρˆ
~bA
S :=
3⊗
i=1
ρˆ
bAi
Si
. (1)
Here, ρˆ
bAi
Si
denotes a density operator of the ith pulse
when bAi is chosen. We suppose that each system
Ri that purifies each of the state ρˆ
bAi
Si
is possessed
by Alice, and Eve does not have access to system
Ri.
(A2) The vacuum emission probability of the ith pulse
is independent of the chosen bit bAi . That is, we
require that the following equality holds for any i:
trρˆ0Si |vac〉〈vac| = trρˆ1Si |vac〉〈vac|, (2)
where |vac〉 is the vacuum state.
(A3) For any chosen bit sequence ~bA, the probability
that a single-block of pulses contains n (with n ∈
{1, 2, 3}) or more photons is upper-bounded by qn.
That is,
Pr{nblock ≥ n} ≤ qn, (3)
where nblock denotes the number of photons con-
tained in a single-block 1. By using a calibration
method based on a conventional Hanbury-Brown-
Twiss setup with threshold photon detectors [22],
Alice can verify {qn}3n=1 before running the proto-
col. If {qn}3n=1 are estimated from such an off-line
test, we need to assume that these bounds do not
change during the on-line experiment.
We emphasize that for the security proof, we do not
make any assumptions on phase modulations. That is,
the precise control over the phase modulation and its
characterization are not needed. We also emphasize
that we do not make the single-mode assumption on the
pulses, and the optical mode of the emitted pulse can
1 Note that nblock is the sum of the number of photons in all the
optical modes.
depend on the bit bAi . This includes, for example, the
case where the state of the pulse when bAi = 0 (1) is
horizontal (vertical) polarization state. Our framework
covers the original DPS protocol [19] using coherent
states {|α〉, |−α〉}. In this case, qn in Eq. (3) is obtained
through a priori Poissonian assumption. We note that
the previous security proofs [20, 21] of the DPS protocol
have assumed ideally phase modulated single-mode
coherent states {|α〉, | − α〉} with block-wise phase
randomization, which is removed in our analysis.
Next, we list up the assumptions on Bob’s measurement
as follows.
(B1) Bob uses a one-bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferom-
eter with two 50:50 beam splitters (BSs) and with
its delay being equal to the interval of the neigh-
boring emitted pulses.
(B2) After the interferometer, the pulses are detected
by two photon-number-resolving (PNR) detectors,
which can discriminate the vacuum, a single-
photon, and two or more photons of a specific op-
tical mode. A click event of each detector cor-
responds to bit values of 0 and 1, respectively.
We suppose that the quantum efficiencies and dark
countings are the same for both detectors.
In Bob’s measurement, the jth (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) time slot is
defined as an expected detection time at Bob’s detectors
from the superposition of the jth and (j + 1)th incoming
pulses. Also, the 0th (3rd) time slot is defined as an
expected detection time at Bob’s detectors from the
superposition of the 1st (3rd) incoming pulse and the 3rd
incoming pulse in the previous block (1st incoming pulse
in the next block).
Protocol. The protocol runs as follows. In its
description, |κ| denotes the length of a bit sequence κ.
Fig. 1 depicts a protocol with a coherent laser source,
which is one possible implementation within our security
framework.
(P1) Alice chooses a random three-bit sequence ~bA and
sends three pulses in a state ρˆ
~bA
S to Bob via a quan-
tum channel.
(P2) Bob receives an incoming three pulses and puts
them into the Mach-Zehnder interferometer fol-
lowed by photon detection by using the PNR de-
tectors. We call the event detected if Bob detects
exactly one photon in total among the 1st and
2nd time slots. The detection event at the jth
(1 ≤ j ≤ 2) time slot determines the raw key bit
kB ∈ {0, 1}. If Bob does not obtain the detected
event, Alice and Bob skip steps (P3) and (P4) be-
low.
(P3) Bob announces the detected time slot j over an
authenticated public channel.
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FIG. 1: One possible implementation of the protocol within
our security framework. At Alice’s site, coherent laser pulse
trains are generated by a conventional laser source followed
by the phase modulator (PM) that randomly modulates a
phase 0 or pi. At Bob’s site, each pulse train is fed to a one-
bit delay Mach-Zehnder interferometer with two 50:50 beam
splitters (BSs). The pulse trains leaving the interferometer
are measured by two photon-number-resolving (PNR) detec-
tors corresponding to bit values “0” and “1”. A successful
detection event occurs if Bob detects a single-photon in total
among the 1st and 2nd time slots. We emphasize that the use
of a coherent laser source and precise control over PM are one
of the examples of the implementations, and we can use any
source as long as it satisfies assumptions (A1)-(A3).
(P4) Alice calculates her raw key bit kA = b
A
j ⊕ bAj+1.
(P5) Alice and Bob repeat (P1)-(P4) Nem times.
(P6) Alice randomly selects a small portion of her raw
key for random sampling. Over the authenticated
public channel, Alice and Bob compare the bit val-
ues for random sampling and obtain the bit error
rate ebit among the sampled bits. This gives the
estimate of the bit error rate in the remaining por-
tion.
(P7) Alice and Bob respectively define their sifted keys
κA and κB by concatenating their remaining raw
keys.
(P8) Bob corrects the bit errors in κB to make it coincide
with κA by sacrificing |κA|fEC bits of encrypted
public communication from Alice by consuming the
same length of a pre-shared secret key.
(P9) Alice and Bob conduct privacy amplification by
shortening their keys by |κA|fPA to obtain the final
keys.
In this paper, we only consider the secret key rate in the
asymptotic limit of an infinite sifted key length. We con-
sider the limit of Nem →∞ while the following observed
parameters are fixed:
0 ≤ Q := |κA|
Nem
≤ 1, 0 ≤ ebit ≤ 1. (4)
Security proof. Here, we summarize the security proof
of the actual protocol described above and determine the
fraction of privacy amplification fPA in the asymptotic
limit. The proof is detailed in Methods section. Our
proof is based on the security proof [21] of the DPS pro-
tocol with block-wise phase randomization that employs
complementarity [23]. A major difference between our
proof and the previous proof [21] is that we do not assume
block-wise phase randomization. If block-wise phase ran-
domization is performed, the state of each single-block
can be seen as a classical mixture of the total photon
number state. This phase randomization simplifies the
security proof because the amount of privacy amplifica-
tion |κA|fPA can be estimated separately for each photon
number emission. However, under our assumptions (A1)-
(A3), a phase coherence generally exists among blocks,
and the state of each single-block cannot be regarded as a
classical mixture of photon number states. Therefore, we
need to take into account this phase coherence in prov-
ing the security. In our security proof, the central task
is to derive the information increase due to this phase
coherence among the blocks.
For the security proof with complementarity, we con-
sider alternative procedures for Alice’s state preparation
in step (P1) and the calculation of her raw key bit kA in
step (P4). We can employ these alternative procedures
to prove the security of the actual protocol because Al-
ice’s procedure of sending optical pulses, and producing
the final key is identical to the actual protocol. Also,
Bob’s procedure of receiving the pulses and making his
public announcement j (for each round) in the actual
protocol is identical to the corresponding procedure in
the alternative protocol.
As for Alice’s state preparation in step (P1), she al-
ternatively prepares three auxiliary qubits in system
A1A2A3, which remain at Alice’s site during the whole
protocol, and the three pulses (system S) to be sent, in
the following state:
|Φ〉ASR := 2−3/2
3⊗
i=1
1∑
bAi =0
Hˆ|bAi 〉Ai |ψbAi 〉SiRi . (5)
Here, Hˆ := 1/
√
2
∑
x,y=0,1(−1)xy|x〉〈y| is the Hadamard
operator, and |ψbAi 〉SiRi is a purification of ρˆ
bAi
Si
, namely,
trRi |ψbAi 〉〈ψbAi |SiRi = ρˆ
bAi
Si
. Note from the assumption
(A1) that system Ri is assumed to be possessed by Alice.
As for the calculation of the raw key bit kA in
step (P4), this bit can be alternatively extracted by ap-
plying the controlled-not (CNOT) gate on the jth and
(j+ 1)th auxiliary qubits with the jth one being the con-
trol and the (j + 1)th one being the target followed by
measuring the jth auxiliary qubit in the X-basis. Here,
we define the Z-basis states for the jth auxiliary qubit as
{|0〉Aj , |1〉Aj}, and the CNOT gate Uˆ (j)CNOT is defined on
this basis by Uˆ
(j)
CNOT|x〉Aj |y〉Aj+1 = |x〉Aj |x+y mod2〉Aj+1
with x, y ∈ {0, 1}. Also, the X-basis states are defined
as {|+〉Aj , |−〉Aj} with |±〉Aj = (|0〉Aj ± |1〉Aj )/
√
2.
4In order to discuss the security of the key κA, we con-
sider a virtual scenario of how well Alice can predict the
outcome of the measurement complementary to the one
to obtain kA. In particular, we take the Z-basis measure-
ment as the complementary basis, and we need to quan-
tify how well Alice can predict its outcome zj ∈ {0, 1} on
the jth auxiliary qubit. To enhance the accuracy of her
estimation, Alice measures the (j + 1)th auxiliary qubit
in the Z-basis after performing Uˆ
(j)
CNOT on the j
th and
(j + 1)th auxiliary qubits. As for Bob, instead of aiming
at learning κA, he tries to guess the complementary ob-
servable zj to help Alice’s prediction. More specifically,
Bob performs a virual measurement to learn which of the
jth or (j + 1)th half pulse has a single-photon, whose in-
formation is sent to Alice. We define the occurrence of
phase error to be the case where Alice fails her predic-
tion of the complementary measurement outcome zj (see
Eq. (20) for the explicit formula of the POVM element
of obtaining a phase error). Let Nph denote the number
of phase errors, namely, the number of wrong predictions
of zj among |κA| trials. Suppose that the upper bound
f(ωobs) on the number of phase errors is estimated as
a function of ωobs which denotes all the experimentally
available parameters Q, ebit in Eq. (4) and {qn}3n=1 in
Eq. (3). In the asymptotic limit considered here, a suffi-
cient amount of privacy amplification is given by [23]
QfPA = Qh
(
f(ωobs)
|κA|
)
, (6)
where h(x) is defined as h(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−
x) for 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 and h(x) = 1 for x > 0.5. Then, the
secret key rate (per pulse) is given by
R = Q
[
1− fEC − h
(
f(ωobs)
|κA|
)]
/3. (7)
The quantity eUph := f(ωobs)/|κA| in Eq. (7) is the upper
bound on the phase error rate eph := Nph/|κA|. Our
main result, Theorem 1, derives eUph with experimentally
available parameters Q, ebit and {qn}3n=1 (see Methods
section for the proof).
Theorem 1 In the asymptotic limit of large key length
|κA|, the upper bound on the phase error rate is given by
eUph = λebit +
λ
√
q1q3 + q2
Q
(8)
with λ = 3 +
√
5.
From this theorem and Eq. (7), the scaling of the key rate
R with respect to the channel transmission η is estimated.
If the protocol is implemented by a weak coherent laser
pulse as a light source with its mean photon number µ,
the detection rate Q is in the order of O(µη) and both√
q1q3 and q2 are in the order of O(µ
2). To obtain a
10-8
10-7
10-6
10-5
10-4
10-3
10-2
10-2 10-1 100
Ke
y r
ate
 pe
r p
uls
e
Channel transmission
FIG. 2: Secure key rate R per pulse as a function of the
overall channel transmission η. The top, the middle and the
bottom lines respectively represent the key rates for ebit =
0.01, ebit = 0.02 and ebit = 0.03.
positive secret key rate, the upper bound on the phase
error rate must be smaller than 0.5:
eUph =
O(µ2)
O(µη)
=
O(µ)
O(η)
< 0.5. (9)
To maximize the key rate under this constraint, µ
is decreased in proportion to η. Therefore, we find
that the scaling of the key rate is in the order of
R = O(µη) = O(η2).
Simulation of secure key rates. We show the
simulation results of asymptotic key rate R per pulse
given by Eq. (7) as a function of the overall channel
transmission η (including detector efficiency). For sim-
plicity of the simulation, we assume that each emitted
pulse is a coherent pulse from a conventional laser with
mean photon number µ. In this setting, qn in Eq. (3) is
given by
qn =
∞∑
ν=n
e−3µ(3µ)ν/ν!. (10)
We adopt fEC = h(ebit) and suppose the detection rate
as Q = 2ηµe−2ηµ, where in the simulation we omit the
cost of random sampling as its cost is negligible in the
asymptotic limit. In Fig. 2, we plot the key rates for
ebit = 0.01, ebit = 0.02 and ebit = 0.03 (from top to
bottom). The key rates are optimized over µ for each
value of η. The optimized values of µ when ebit = 0.02
is about 7 × 10−5 (with η = 10−2) and about 7 × 10−3
(with η = 1). From these lines, we see that all the
key rates are proportional to η2. If we consider the
overall channel transmission as η = 0.1 × 10−0.5`/10
(with ` denoting the distance between Alice and Bob)
and laser diodes operating at 1 GHz repetition rate, we
5can generate a secure key at a rate of 170 bits s−1 for a
channel length of 50km and a bit error rate of 1%.
Discussion
In this paper, we have provided the information-
theoretic security proof of the DPS protocol based
on simple source characterizations. Once one admits
the commonly used assumption (A1) to be physically
reasonable, our proof only requires the independence of
the vacuum emission probability from a chosen bit, and
the upper bounds {qn}3n=1 on the probabilities that a
single-block contains at least n (n ∈ {1, 2, 3}) photons.
Even with these experimentally simple assumptions, we
demonstrated that we can generate a secret key at the
rate of about 100 bits s−1 for inner-city QKD (` ∼ 50
km) given realistic bit error rate of 1% ∼ 3%.
We end with some open questions. As for Al-
ice’s side, it is interesting to extend our security
proof by relaxing the assumption (A2) to the case
where the vacuum emission probability is different
trρˆ0Si |vac〉〈vac| 6= trρˆ1Si |vac〉〈vac|, and Alice only knows
the bounds on trρˆ0Si |vac〉〈vac| and trρˆ1Si |vac〉〈vac|. As
for Bob’s measurement unit, it is important to relax the
assumption (B2) to allow the use of threshold detectors.
Methods
Outline. Here we prove our main result, Theorem 1.
First, we introduce notations that we use in the following
discussions. Second, we introduce the POVM (positive
operator valued measure) elements corresponding to
a bit and phase error. Third, we explain the relation
between the Z-basis measurement outcome (zj) on the
auxiliary qubit system Aj and the number of photons
contained in the jth emitted pulse. Finally, we prove
Theorem 1 by using two lemmas, Lemmas 1 and 2. We
leave the proofs of Lemmas 1 and 2 to Appendixes A
and B, respectively.
Notations. We first summarize the notations that
we use in the following discussions:
Pˆ [|ψ〉] := |ψ〉〈ψ| (11)
for a vector |ψ〉 that is not necessarily normalized, and
the Kronecker delta
δx,y :=
{
1 x = y
0 x 6= y. (12)
Furthermore, we introduce the Z-basis states of Alice’s
auxiliary qubit system A as
|z〉A :=
3⊗
i=1
|zi〉Ai (13)
with z = z1z2z3 and zi ∈ {0, 1}, and wt(z) denotes the
Hamming weight of a bit string z. Let us define the
projectors Pˆa (with 0 ≤ a ≤ 3), Pˆeven and Pˆodd as
Pˆa :=
∑
z:wt(z)=a
Pˆ [|z〉A],
Pˆeven := Pˆ0 + Pˆ2,
Pˆodd := Pˆ1 + Pˆ3. (14)
POVM element for a detected event. We intro-
duce POVM elements for Bob’s procedure of determin-
ing the detected time slot j and the bit value kB . Based
on the following procedure, Bob can determine whether
the event is detected or not prior to determining j and
kB . Bob sends the first pulse to the first BS in Fig. 1,
and after the first pulse is split, one of the pulses goes to
the long arm of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer, and we
call it first half pulse. Bob keeps the second pulse as it is,
and sends the third pulse to the first BS. After the third
pulse is split at the first BS, one of the pulses goes to the
short arm of the Mach-Zehnder interferometer (we call
it the third half pulse). Bob then performs the quantum
nondemolition (QND) measurement of the total photon
number among the first half pulse, the third half pulse
and the second pulse. The detected event is equivalent
to an event where the QND measurement reveals exactly
one photon. If the detected event occurs, the state of the
three pulses after the QND measurement is in the sub-
space spanned by the orthonormal basis {|i〉B}3i=1 with i
representing the position of the single-photon (at the half
pulse when i = 1, 3 and at the original pulse when i = 2).
Given the detection, the POVM elements {Πˆj,kB}j,kB for
detecting the bit kB at the j
th time slot (1 ≤ j ≤ 2) is
given by
Πˆj,kB = Pˆ [|Πj,kB 〉B ] (15)
with
|Πj,kB 〉B :=
√
wj |j〉B + (−1)kB√wj+1|j + 1〉B√
2
, (16)
where w1 = w3 = 1 and w2 = 1/2.
Bit- and phase-error POVM elements. Here,
we construct the bit- and phase-error POVM elements
eˆbit and eˆph, respectively. Alice and Bob measure their
systems A and B just after the QND measurement
reveals exactly one photon to learn whether a bit
error or phase error exists. Importantly, these POVM
elements are defined only on Alice’s auxiliary qubit
system A and Bob’s system B, and the assumptions
on the encoded states in system S do not come into
their description. Therefore, even if the assumptions
on Alice’s emitted states are different from those in the
security proof [21] of the DPS protocol with block-wise
phase randomization, the same formulas of the bit- and
phase-error POVM elements in [21] can be used. Here,
6we only provide brief explanations of how to construct
eˆbit and eˆph, and refer details to Ref. [21].
First, we introduce the POVM element eˆjbit corre-
sponding to announcing the jth time slot and the occur-
rence of a bit error. As a bit error occurs when kA (Alice’s
X-basis measurement outcome of the jth auxiliary qubit
after performing Uˆ
(j)
CNOT on the j
th and (j + 1)th ones)
and Bob’s measurement outcome kB are different, eˆ
j
bit is
given by
eˆjbit = (Pˆ [|+ +〉AjAj+1 ] + Pˆ [| − −〉AjAj+1 ])⊗ Πˆj,1
+ (Pˆ [|+−〉AjAj+1 ] + Pˆ [| −+〉AjAj+1 ])⊗ Πˆj,0. (17)
Here and henceforth, we omit identity operators on sub-
systems, such as those for Alice’s irrelevant auxiliary
qubits in the above equation. Eq. (17) is re-expressed
as
eˆjbit =
1∑
s=0
{
Pˆ
[ |00〉AjAj+1 + (−1)s|11〉AjAj+1√
2
]
+ Pˆ
[ |01〉AjAj+1 + (−1)s|10〉AjAj+1√
2
]}
⊗ Πˆj,s⊕1. (18)
This equation shows that there are no cross terms be-
tween even parity terms (|zjzj+1〉AjAj+1 with zj +zj+1 is
even) and odd parity terms (|zjzj+1〉AjAj+1 with zj+zj+1
is odd). Therefore, we have
eˆjbit = Pˆeveneˆ
j
bitPˆeven + Pˆoddeˆ
j
bitPˆodd. (19)
This equation can be derived more intuitively. The parity
of wt(z) can be determined by measuring the auxiliary
qubits in the Z-basis except for the jth one after perform-
ing Uˆ
(j)
CNOT on the j
th and (j + 1)th qubits. This implies
that the measurement {Pˆeven, Pˆodd} and eˆjbit commute,
and hence we obtain Eq. (19). Eq. (19) plays an impor-
tant role in proving Theorem 1.
Second, we introduce the POVM element eˆjph corre-
sponding to announcing the jth time slot and the occur-
rence of a phase error. A phase error event is defined as
an event where Alice fails her prediction of the Z-basis
measurement outcome zj on the j
th auxiliary qubit. To
enhance the accuracy of her estimation, she measures
the (j + 1)th auxiliary qubit in the Z basis (with zj+1
denoting its result) after performing Uˆ
(j)
CNOT, and Bob
measures system B to learn which of the jth or (j + 1)th
pulse has a single-photon. With the help of information
of zj+1 and Bob’s information, Alice adopts the following
strategy for predicting zj . As for the case of zj+1 = 1,
if Bob reveals that the jth [(j + 1)th] pulse has a single-
photon, Alice predicts zj = 1 [zj = 0]. On the other
hand, if zj+1 = 0, Alice predicts zj = 0 regardless of
Bob’s information. The phase error event is defined as
an instance of a wrong prediction of zj , and the POVM
element corresponding to announcing the jth time slot
and the occurrence of a phase error is represented by
eˆjph =
∑
z
Pˆ [|z〉A]
⊗
[
wjδzj+1,1Pˆ [|j〉B ] + wj+1δzj ,1Pˆ [|j + 1〉B ]
]
. (20)
Since eˆjph is diagonal in the basis |z〉A, we have
eˆjph =
3∑
a=0
Pˆaeˆ
j
phPˆa. (21)
Then, by taking the sum over all the time slots, we obtain
the bit and phase error operators as
eˆbit :=
2∑
j=1
eˆjbit, eˆph :=
2∑
j=1
eˆjph. (22)
It follows that the probability of having a bit error is
given by trσˆeˆbit, and the one of having a phase error
is trσˆeˆph. Here, σˆ denotes a state of Alice and Bob’s
systems A and B just after the QND measurement
reveals exactly one photon.
Relation between wt(z) and nblock. Here, we derive
the relation between wt(z) and nblock. For this, we first
derive the number of photons (nj) contained in system
Sj when zj = 1. Recall that the assumption (A2) guar-
antees that trρˆ0Sj |vac〉〈vac| = trρˆ1Sj |vac〉〈vac| =: P vacj .
From this assumption, by expanding the orthonormal
basis of Sj with the photon number states, |ψ0〉SjRj (a
purification of ρˆ0Sj ) and |ψ′1〉SjRj (a purification of ρˆ1Sj )
can be written as
|ψ0〉SjRj =
√
P vacj |vac〉Sj |u0〉Rj +
√
P 1j,0|1〉Sj |u1〉Rj + · · · ,
(23)
|ψ′1〉SjRj =
√
P vacj |vac〉Sj |v0〉Rj +
√
P 1j,1|1〉Sj |v1〉Rj + · · · .
(24)
Here, |u0〉, |u1〉, |v0〉 and |v1〉 are normalized vectors of
system Rj , and P
1
j,bAj
:= trρˆ
bAj
Sj
|1〉〈1|. Since a purification
has a freedom of choosing a unitary operator Uˆ on system
Rj , the following state |ψ1〉SjRj is also a purification of
ρˆ1Sj :
|ψ1〉SjRj
=
√
P vacj |vac〉Sj Uˆ |v0〉Rj +
√
P 1j,1|1〉Sj Uˆ |v1〉Rj + · · · .
(25)
In the following discussions, Uˆ is chosen such that
Uˆ |v0〉 = |u0〉 holds. Note from Eq. (5) that if zj = 1,
the jth state can be written as |Φ−〉SjRj := (|ψ0〉SjRj −
|ψ1〉SjRj )/N , where N is an appropriate normalization
7constant. Using Eqs. (23) and (25) gives the vacuum
emission probability of |Φ−〉SjRj as
trPˆ [|Φ−〉SjRj ]|vac〉〈vac|Sj = 0. (26)
This equation means that if zj = 1, the state in system
Sj contains at least one photon. That is,
zj = 1→ nj ≥ 1. (27)
Therefore, we obtain
wt(z) ≥ a→ nblock =
3∑
j=1
nj ≥ a, (28)
and from Eq. (3), the following inequality holds
Pr{wt(z) ≥ a} ≤ Pr{nblock ≥ a} ≤ qa. (29)
Proof of Theorem 1. Here, we prove Theorem 1 in
the main text. For this, we first find an upper-bound
on the phase error probability treˆphσˆ in terms of the bit
error probability treˆbitσˆ, which holds for any state σˆ.
According to Eq. (20), since eˆph is diagonalized in the
basis |z〉A and Pˆ0eˆphPˆ0 = 0, we have
treˆphσˆ =trPˆ1eˆphPˆ1σˆ +
3∑
a=2
trPˆaeˆphPˆaσˆ
≤trPˆ1eˆphPˆ1σˆ +
3∑
a=2
trPˆaσˆ. (30)
To upper-bound trPˆ1eˆphPˆ1σˆ with experimentally avail-
able data, we employ the following Lemmas 1 and 2 (see
Appendixes A and B for their proofs).
Lemma 1
Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1 ≤ λPˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 (31)
with λ := 3 +
√
5.
Lemma 2 For any density operator σˆ,
trPˆ1eˆbitPˆ1σˆ ≤ treˆbitσˆ +
√
trσˆPˆ1 · trσˆPˆ3. (32)
Applying Lemmas 1 and 2 to Eq. (30) leads to
treˆphσˆ ≤ λ
(
treˆbitσˆ +
√
trσˆPˆ1 · trσˆPˆ3
)
+
3∑
a=2
trPˆaσˆ.
(33)
With the relation between the bit and phase error
probabilities, the next step is to derive an upper bound
on the number of phase errors with experimentally avail-
able data. For this, we use Azuma’s inequality [24] to
achieve this goal. Suppose that there are Ndet detected
systems AB, and Alice and Bob sequentially measure
each detected state in order. Let us consider the following
specific way for choosing the sampled bits among the de-
tected events; Alice probabilistically associates each de-
tected event with a sample pair with probability 1− t or
a code pair with probability t, where 0 < t < 1. The
sample pairs are employed for random sampling to ob-
tain ebit whereas the code pairs are for distilling secret
key. For each code (sample) pair, Alice and Bob mea-
sure their systems to learn whether a phase (bit) error
occurs or not. If a code (sample) pair entails a phase
(bit) error, we call such an event “ph” (“bit”), otherwise
we call “ph” (“bit”). Also, for each code pair, Alice mea-
sures her system A in the Z-basis to obtain the outcome
wt(z) = a ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}. Such simulataneous measure-
ments are allowed because [eˆph, Pˆa] = 0 holds for any
a (0 ≤ a ≤ 3). In this stochastic trial, the set of the
measurement outcomes for each detected event is given
by S := {bit,bit} ∪ (⋃3a=0{ph ∧ a}) ∪ (⋃3a=0{ph ∧ a}),
and let ξi ∈ S denote the ith measurement outcome with
1 ≤ i ≤ Ndet.
Next, let us introduce various parameters that are
needed in later discussions. The phase error rate in the
code pair and the bit error rate in the sample pair are
defined as
eph =
∑3
a=0
∑Ndet
i=1 δξi,ph∧a
Ncode
, ebit =
∑Ndet
i=1 δξi,bit
Nsample
, (34)
where Ncode and Nsample respectively denote the number
of code and sample pairs. We define the number N lΩ of
events that take Ω ∈ S among l trials as
N lΩ :=
l∑
i=1
δξi,Ω, (35)
and the sum P lΩ of probabilities of obtaining Ω at the i
th
trial conditioned on the previous outcomes {ξk}i−1k=0 with
ξ0 being constant as
P lΩ :=
l∑
i=1
Pr{ξi = Ω|{ξk}i−1k=0}. (36)
We can show that the sequence of random variables
{X0γ , ..., XNdetγ } (with γ ∈ {ph,bit, a}), which are defined
as
X lph :=
3∑
a=0
(P lph∧a −N lph∧a) (37)
X lbit := P
l
bit −N lbit (38)
X la := (P
l
ph∧a + P
l
ph∧a)− (N lph∧a +N lph∧a) (39)
and X0γ := 0, satisfies the Martingale condition with re-
spect to random variables {ξ0, ξ1, ..., ξNdet}, that is ∀l,
E[X lγ |{ξk}l−1k=0] = X l−1γ . Here, E[X|Y ] denotes the ex-
pectation of X conditioned on Y . Also, {X0γ , ..., XNdetγ }
8satisfies a bounded difference condition, namely, ∀l,
|X lγ − X l−1γ | ≤ 1. Once Martingale and the bounded
difference conditions are satisfied, we can apply Azuma’s
inequality; it follows that ∀ζ > 0 and ∀Ndet > 0
Pr{|XNdetγ | > Ndetζ} ≤ 2e−
Ndetζ
2
2 . (40)
Since Eq. (33) holds for any σˆ, by using Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality:
∑m
i=1 xiyi ≤
√
(
∑m
i=1 x
2
i ) (
∑m
i=1 y
2
i ),
we have
P˜Ndetph
t
≤ λ
PNdetbit
1− t +
√
P˜Ndeta≥1
t
P˜Ndeta=3
t
+ P˜Ndeta≥2
t
, (41)
where P˜Ndetph :=
∑3
a=0 P
Ndet
ph∧a and P˜
Ndet
a := P
Ndet
ph∧a+P
Ndet
ph∧a.
By employing the consequence of Azuma’s inequality
in Eq. (40) to each of all the five sums of conditional
probabilities in Eq. (41), we obtain
1
t
(
N˜Ndetph
Ndet
− ζ
)
≤ λ
1− t
(
NNdetbit
Ndet
+ ζ
)
+
1
t
(
N˜Ndeta≥2
Ndet
+ ζ
)
+
λ
t
√√√√(N˜Ndeta=1
Ndet
+ ζ
)(
N˜Ndeta=3
Ndet
+ ζ
)
,
(42)
where N˜Ndetph :=
∑3
a=0N
Ndet
ph∧a and N˜
Ndet
a := N
Ndet
ph∧a +
NNdet
ph∧a. When Ndet gets larger with any fixed ζ > 0, the
probability of violating Eq. (42) decreases exponentially.
Here and henceforth, we consider the limit of large Ndet
and neglect ζ. In this asymptotic limit, as Ncode → tNdet
and Nsample → (1− t)Ndet in Eq. (34), we obtain
eph ≤ λebit + 1
t
N˜Ndeta≥2
Ndet
+
λ
t
√
N˜Ndeta=1
Ndet
N˜Ndeta=3
Ndet
. (43)
The last task for deriving the upper bound on eph is to
upper-bound N˜Ndeta≥n with experimentally available data.
In so doing, in addition to the detected instances, we as-
sume that Alice and Bob randomly associate each of the
non-detected instances with a code instance with proba-
bility t or a sample instance with probability 1−t. Then,
we have that the the number N˜Ndeta≥n of obtaining the out-
come a ≥ n among the detected instances can never be
larger than the one MNema≥n among the emitted code blocks.
Since the probability of obtaining a code pair and the
outcome a ≥ n when Alice emits the ith block is upper-
bounded by qn according to Eq. (29), we can imagine
independent trials with probability qn. Therefore, we
can use Chernoff bound and obtain
N˜Ndeta≥n
Nem
≤ M
Nem
a≥n
Nem
≤ qn + χ. (44)
When the number Nem of emitted blocks gets larger for
any fixed χ > 0, the probability of violating this inequal-
ity decreases exponentially. In the condition of asymp-
totic limit of Nem, we neglect χ in the following discus-
sions. By substituting Eq. (44) to Eq. (43), we finally
obtain
eph ≤ λebit +
λ
√
q1q3 + q2
Q
. (45)
This ends the proof of Theorem 1. 
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Appendix A: Proof of Lemma 1
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 1 in the main text.
We first explicitly describe Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 and Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1 by re-
spectively using Eqs. (18) and (20) as
Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 = Pˆ
[ |001〉A√
2
]
⊗
(
Pˆ [|1〉B ] + 1
2
Pˆ [|2〉B ]
)
+Pˆ
[ |100〉A√
2
]
⊗
(
1
2
Pˆ [|2〉B ] + Pˆ [|3〉B ]
)
+
1∑
s=0
Pˆ
[ |010〉A + (−1)s|100〉A√
2
]
⊗ Πˆ1,s⊕1
+
1∑
s=0
Pˆ
[ |001〉A + (−1)s|010〉A√
2
]
⊗Π2,s⊕1, (A1)
Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1 = (Pˆ [|001〉A] + Pˆ [|100〉A])⊗ Pˆ [|2〉B ]
2
+ Pˆ [|010〉A]⊗ (Pˆ [|1〉] + Pˆ [|3〉B ]). (A2)
In Eq. (A1), it is straightforward to show that
91∑
s=0
Pˆ
[ |010〉A + (−1)s|100〉A√
2
]
⊗ Πˆ1,s⊕1 = Pˆ
 |100〉A|1〉B − |010〉A|2〉B√2√
2
+ Pˆ
 |010〉A|1〉B − |100〉A|2〉B√2√
2
 ,
1∑
s=0
Pˆ
[ |001〉A + (−1)s|010〉A)√
2
]
⊗ Πˆ2,s⊕1 = Pˆ
 |001〉A|3〉B − |010〉A|2〉B√2√
2
+ Pˆ
 |010〉A|3〉B − |001〉A|2〉B√2√
2
 .
To upper-bound Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1 by using Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1, we remove
the four projectors in Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 that are orthogonal to the
range of Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1, which results in
Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 ≥ 1
2
(
Pˆ
[ |001〉A√
2
]
+ Pˆ
[ |100〉A√
2
])
⊗ Pˆ [|2〉B ] + Pˆ
 |010〉A|1〉B − |100〉A|2〉B√2√
2
+ Pˆ
 |010〉A|3〉B − |001〉A|2〉B√2√
2
 .
(A3)
Moreover, we apply the following inequality that holds
for any normalized vectors |a〉 and |b〉 with 〈a|b〉 = 0 2,
Pˆ
[
|a〉 − |b〉√
2
]
≥ 2
λ
(
Pˆ [|a〉] + Pˆ
[ |b〉√
2
])
− Pˆ
[ |b〉√
2
]
(A5)
with λ := 3 +
√
5, to the last two projectors of the rhs in
Eq. (A3) and obtain
Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ1 ≥ 1
2
(
Pˆ
[ |001〉A√
2
]
+ Pˆ
[ |100〉A√
2
])
⊗ Pˆ [|2〉B ]
+
1
λ
(
P [|010〉A|1〉B ] + P
[ |100〉A|2〉B√
2
])
− Pˆ [|100〉A|2〉B ]
4
+
1
λ
(
P [|010〉A|3〉B ] + P
[ |001〉A|2〉B√
2
])
− Pˆ [|001〉A|2〉B ]
4
=Pˆ1eˆphPˆ1/λ. (A6)
This ends the proof of Lemma 1. 
2 Note that Eq. (A5) holds because the smallest eigenvalue of the
following Hermitian operator:
Pˆ
[
|a〉 − |b〉√
2
]
− 2
λ
(
Pˆ [|a〉] + Pˆ
[ |b〉√
2
])
+ Pˆ
[ |b〉√
2
]
(A4)
is zero.
Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 2
In this Appendix, we prove Lemma 2 in the main text.
From Eq. (19), for any state σˆ we have
trPˆoddeˆbitPˆoddσˆ ≤ treˆbitσˆ, (B1)
which leads to
trPˆ1eˆbitPˆ1σˆ ≤ treˆbitσˆ − tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3 + Pˆ3eˆbitPˆ1)σˆ. (B2)
Since −tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3 + Pˆ3eˆbitPˆ1)σˆ ≤ |tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3σˆ)| +
|tr(Pˆ3eˆbitPˆ1σˆ)| = 2|tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3σˆ)| 3, we derive an up-
per bound on |tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3σˆ)|. From the expression of
the POVM element eˆjbit given by Eq. (18), we have
Tˆ := 2Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3 = |001〉〈111|A ⊗ (Πˆ1,1 − Πˆ1,0)
+ |100〉〈111|A ⊗ (Πˆ2,1 − Πˆ2,0). (B3)
As (Πˆ1,1−Πˆ1,0)2 = (|1〉〈1|+|2〉〈2|)/2 and (Πˆ2,1−Πˆ2,0)2 =
(|2〉〈2|+ |3〉〈3|)/2, we obtain
Tˆ †Tˆ =Pˆ [|111〉A]⊗ [(Πˆ1,1 − Πˆ1,0)2 + (Πˆ2,1 − Πˆ2,0)2]
≤IˆAB . (B4)
This inequality implies that the operator norm of Tˆ is
upper-bounded by 1:
||Tˆ ||∞ := min{c ≥ 0 s.t. ∀v ||Tˆ v|| ≤ c||v||} ≤ 1, (B5)
3 The last equality comes from the fact that |trAˆ| = |trAˆ†| holds
for any square matrix Aˆ.
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where || · || := √〈·|·〉. Next, we define
Gˆ := Pˆ3σˆPˆ1. (B6)
Its trace norm ||Gˆ||1 is written by using a unitary oper-
ator Wˆ and is calculated as
||Gˆ||1 = |trGˆWˆ | = |(
√
σˆPˆ3,
√
σˆPˆ1Wˆ )|
≤
√
(
√
σˆPˆ3,
√
σˆPˆ3)
√
(
√
σˆPˆ1Wˆ ,
√
σˆPˆ1Wˆ )
=
√
trPˆ3σˆ
√
trPˆ1σˆ, (B7)
where we use the definition of Hilbert-Schmidt inner
product in the second equality and use Schwarz inequal-
ity in the first inequality. Finally, using Ho¨lder’s inequal-
ity, Eqs. (B5) and (B7) gives
2|tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3σˆ)| = |trTˆ Gˆ| ≤ ||Tˆ Gˆ||1 ≤ ||Tˆ ||∞||Gˆ||1
≤
√
trPˆ3σˆ · trPˆ1σˆ. (B8)
Therefore, we obtain
−tr(Pˆ1eˆbitPˆ3 + trPˆ3eˆbitPˆ1)σˆ ≤
√
trPˆ1σˆ · trPˆ3σˆ. (B9)
Finally, by using Eqs. (B2) and (B9), we conclude that
trPˆ1eˆbitPˆ1σˆ ≤ treˆbitσˆ +
√
trσˆPˆ1 · trσˆPˆ3. (B10)
This ends the proof of Lemma 2. 
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